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Elements in the Changing Postwar
Mortgage Market
THE changed structure of mortgage debt and markets, surveyed in Chapter
2, resulted from the interplay of numerous economic, financial, and
sociopolitical forces. The purpose of this chapter is to select and describe
the main elements of these forces at work during the post-World War II
decade. Their dynamic nature is reflected in the record of annual and
quarterly changes in the flow of funds into the various sectors of the
mortgage market. That record is analyzed in Chapter 5 after the basic
subject of mortgage yields is explored in Chapter 4.
During most of the 1946—1956 period, the major elements, both private
and federal,influencingresidential mortgage market developments
tended to be expansionary.During a part of the decade, however,
restraining influences, also both private and public in character, acted to
limit the flow of funds into mortgage markets.
In an appraisal of the major influential elements at work, the decade
down roughly into two equal time periods. The major turning
point in the mortgage market as in other sectors of the capital market
occurred in March 1951, when the Federal Reserve and Treasury
reached an "accord" resulting in the withdrawal in principle of Federal
Reserve support of the market for federal obligations.Several months
earlier, with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, steps had been taken by
the government to limit the volume of new construction and the flow of
mortgage funds, culminating in the issuance of Regulation X on real
estate credit under the Defense Production Act of 1950.1 The restraints
placed by federal action on both the supply of mortgage credit and the
demand for it brought to an end a unique five-year period during which,
with limited exceptions, unrestrained expansionary forces had resulted in
the availability of an ample supply of funds to meet large and rising
demands for mortgages. While the flow of mortgage funds in the second
half of the decade was substantially greater than in the first half, there
was not again such an extended period of high tide in mortgage funds.
Expansionary Influences at Work, 1946—1950
With the end of World War II the stage was set for a rapid expansion
in mortgage market activity, which continued almost without abatement
1PublicLaw 774, 81st Congress, approved September 8, 1950.
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through 1950. Demands for mortgage credit to finance construction and
real estate transactions were great;financial institutions were actively
seeking new investment outlets; federal actions with respect to general
fiscal and credit policies, as well as specific mortgage and housing pro-
grams, were expansionary; and mortgage yields were relatively attractive
to both lenders and borrowers.
DEMAND FOR MORTGAGE CREDIT
At the war's end, the nation's needs for additional real estate facilities
were acute following wartime restrictions superimposed upon the sharply
reduced activity during the depressed 1930's.Families separated or
dislocated during the war and requiring new accommodations, rapid
demobilization of the armed forces, sharply rising marriage and birth rates,
and heavy migration of population placed mounting pressure on limited
housing facilities.Of the 33.5 million married couples in the United
States shortly after the war's end, 3 million or nearly 9 per cent were
sharing living quarters, many more in number and proportion than before
the war. Uncounted other families were living in temporary, makeshift
accommodations. Demands for new and improved living quarters were
backed by high and rising incomes and a growing accumulation of liquid
assets.
Demands for mortgage funds to finance construction and acquisition of
nonresidential properties were also large, but the needs were not so
pressing as those for residential facilities. A large part of nonresidential
construction and transfer activity was financed from internal sources and
through other sectors of the capital market, particularly the corporate
bond market.Moreover, in efforts to conserve scarce materials and
manpower for construction of housing, especially for veterans, federal
restrictions were placed on the construction of nonresidential facilities.
The restrictions remained in effect for little more than a year during the
short-lived Veterans Emergency Housing Program (see the discussion of
federal mortgage programs and policies, below).
LIQUIDITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The flow of mortgage funds to finance production of new structures and
acquisition of existing real estate in the immediate postwar years was
limited more by the lack of available or newly constructed accommoda-
tions than by the supply of mortgage credit. Financial institutions found
themselves in an unusually liquid position with investment portfolios
heavily weighted with large holdings of U.S. government obligations.
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They a mounted at the end of 1945 to well over one-half of all assets held
by the four main groups of financial institutions, compared with less
than one-tenth for mortgages.2 In volume of government securities held,
commercial banks ranked first, followed by life insurance companies
and mutual savings banks;savings and loan associations, specialized
mortgage lenders, ranked last in absolute amount and also in ratio to
total
TABLE 10
Net Sale of Federal Government Securities and Net Acquisition of
Mortgages by Four Main Types of Financial Institutions, 1946—1956
(dollars in billions)
1946—1950 1951—1956
Net Sale Net Net Sale Net
Govern-Acquisi-Ratio Govern-Acquisi-Ratio
ment tion of (I) ment tion of (1)
SecuritiesMortgagesto (2) SecuritiesMortgagesto (2)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Selected financial
institutions 36.4 30.8 118.2 12.6 59.3 21.2
Savings and loan
associations 0.9 8.2 12.2 1.3 22.0 —5.9
Life insurance
companies 7.1 9.5 75.8 5.9 16.9 34.9
Commercial banks 28.6 8.9 321.3 5.4 9.0 60.0
Mutual savings
—0.1 4.1 —2.4 2.6 11.4 22.3
SOURCE: Data from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
These financial institutions were anxious to convert their large holdings
of risk less but low-yielding assets into investments yielding higher returns.
Moreover, outlets for the flow of new savings were needed to replace the
purch.ase of government securities that had dominated the wartime
capital markets. The Federal Reserve policy of supporting government
bond prices at par made possible the sale of such securities readily and
without penalty. As a result, sales of Treasury obligations proceeded
rapidly during the period of support, providing a large reservoir of funds
to meet private capital demands. .
The$36 billion acquired from sale of government securities by financial
institutions during the first 'fi$'e postwar years exceeded their total net
of mortgages (Table 10).The large volume of funds was
supplemented by an almost equally large net savings inflow of $33
billion. For commercial banks and life insurance companies the sale of
2Basedon data from various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
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governments provided the major source of investment funds; for mutual
savings banks and savings and loan associations savings inflows were the
major source.Variations in the pattern of investment behavior among
the four types of financial institutions (Table 10) were the outcome of a
number of important factors, legal and organizational as well as financial
(discussed later in Chapter 5, the section on mortgage flows relative to
other capital market flows). Briefly, while only commercial banks showed
net acquisition of mortgages less than net sale of government securities
through 1950, a large but unmeasurable amount of commercial bank
funds flowed into construction and interim financing loans.Thus, the
unusual liquidity of commercial banks permitted a larger volume of
permanent financing by other institutions than might otherwise have been
possible.
FEDERAL MORTGAGE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES
In a setting of ready availability of investment funds from financial
institutions, the federal government took a series of steps successively
liberalizing both its VA and FHA mortgage guaranty and insurance
programs. In addition, several bold new housing and mortgage under-
writing programs were inaugurated, and expanded secondary mortgage
market facilities were provided. These actions, in conjunction with the
federal policy of supporting government bond prices at par, created a
financial climate in which mortgage loans were especially inviting to
financial institutions in comparison with other capital market investments.
That the federal government has come to play a unique and strategic
role in housing and mortgage markets is widely recognized. In no other
sector of the private capital market—or of the entire nonfarm economy,
for that matter—is there such broad federal participation as there is in
mortgage markets. A study of postwar mortgage finance would be in-
complete, therefore, without an analysis of major federal actions taken
in the area since the end of the war. Legislative or administrative details,
however, that are adequately provided in several cited sources, are not
given here.
The guns of World War II had scarcely been silenced when the federal
government took the first of several direct actions to stimulate the flow of
funds into the mortgage sector of the capital market. At the end of 1945,
the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of was amended to make VA-
guaranteed loans more acceptable to both lenders and borrowers, as well
as builders.Principally, the amendments provided for (I) an increase in
P.L. 346, 78th Congress, approved June 22, 1944.
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the maximum amount of government guarantee from $2,000 to $4,000,
(2) an extension of maximum maturities from twenty to twenty-five years,
and (3) a change in the basis of property appraisal from "reasonable
normal value" to simply "reasonable value." In addition, the act author-
ized su'Dervised lenders to extend VA-guaranteed loans to eligible veterans
without prior approval by the Veterans Administration.4
In to further stimulate production of housing and extension of
mortgage credit for veterans, the Veterans Emergency Housing Program
was put into effect in May 1946, restoring wartime construction controls
and renewing liberal wartime FHA mortgage insurance provisions under
Title VI of the National Housing Act.5 Under the reactivated FHA
mortgage program, property appraisals were based on the concept of
"necessary current cost" rather than "value," and maximum insurable
loan amounts were raised on both owner occupied and rental properties.
Twice extended beyond its original expiration date, the program was
finally allowed to expire on April 30, 1948. Four months later, however,
with the enactment of the Housing Act of 1948, the FHA "emergency"
program was reactivated until March 31, 1949, for new rental housing
only (section 608 of the National Housing Act).That program was
further liberalized by authorization of higher maximum insurable mort-
gage amounts.6
The Housing Act of 1948 was based on the theory that production of
housing could be increased by stimulating both the demand for mortgage
funds and their supply. The act, therefore, in addition to reactivating part
of the FHA Title VI program, liberalized prewar terms of the permanent
FHA mortgage insurance program under Title II by authorizing increases
in maximum insurable loan amounts, loan-to-value ratios, and maturities.
It provided, further, for special new programs of mortgage insurance and,
perhaps most important in stimulating the flow of FHA and VA mortgage
funds, it increased the ability of the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion (FNMA) to purchase federally underwritten mortgages.7
Activities of FNMA, and government actions taken to influence them,
have played a key role in the postwar mortgage market, almost entirely
'P.L.268, 79th Congress, approved December 28, 1944.
See Miles L. Colean, The Impact of Government on Real Estate Finance in the United States,
New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950, p. 106,fora discussion of the
Veterans' Emergency Housing Program.
ThVeterans Emergency Housing Act proved a dismal failure and most of its
provisions were discontinued by mid-1947.
A more detailed description of the provisions of this act pertaining to FHA mortgage
insurance may be found in the Federal Housing Administration's Fifteenth Annual Report,
December 31, 1948, pp. 1—4. A summary of all major provisions of the act is given by
Colean, op. cit., pp. 124—125.
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an expansive one during the first half of the decade. The first major
action in that direction was taken on July 1, 1948 (one month before
passage of the Housing Act of 1948) when this federally sponsored secon-
dary mortgage market facility was completely reorganized under a new
charter. The result was a greatly enlarged capacity to purchase mort-
gages, authority to purchase VA as well as FHA loans and to issue advance
commitments to purchase them.8 The new charter was intended to
stimulate the flow of VA loans, which had been declining from its high
1947 level, partly as a result of the widening spread between rising interest
rates on U.S. government and other securities and the fixed 4 per cent rate
on VA loans (see Chart6and Chap. 5, pp. 113—114). The intended stimulus
was largely nullified, however, by the restrictive provision permitting
the Association to purchase only one-fourth of the dollar amount of FHA
and VA loans originated by a lender. The provision was liberalized one
month later in the Housing Act of 1948 to permit purchase up to one-half
of the eligible mortgages originated by a lender.Little more than one
year later, liberalization reached its peak with statutory authority to
purchase all eligible VA loans originated by a lender.
The steady extension of FNMA's purchasing authority, the continua-
tion of its authority to make advance commitments to purchase mortgages,
and its administrative policy of purchasing all mortgages at par brought
the Association a steadily increasing mortgage portfolio and placed the
statutory limit on its holdings under constant pressure. The willingness
of Congress to increase the limit steadily, however, maintained FNMA
as an effective support to the mortgage market throughout the first half of
the postwar decade. In .a period of little more than nine months, through
April 1950, maximum permitted mortgage holdings were increased three
times—to $1.5 billion, to $2.5 billion, and to $2.75 billion. About two
years later, in July 1952, a final increase to $3.75 billion was authorized.
The last increase came well after Congress had recognized that FNMA
had become a prime generator of mortgage funds and had attempted to
limit the drain on the Treasury in the Housing Act of 1950 by rescinding
the Association's authority to make advance commitments.9 The need to
increase further FNMA's purchasing authority two years later arose from
8P.L.864, 80th Congress, enacted July 1, 1948. Under its original charter granted in
February 1938, FNMA was authorized to purchase only FHA loans and had a maximum
borrowing authority of $220 million (increased to $840 million by the July 1 Act). For a
time the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) Mortgage Company was authorized
to purchase VA loans (August, 1946—June, 1947) but little use was made of this facility.
FromJune 30, 1947, when RFC was terminated, untiljuly 1, 1948, no federally sponsored
secondary market facility existed for VA loans.
P.L. 475, 81st Congress, enacted April 20, 1950.
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the continued large volume of mortgage purchases made under earlier
outstan.ding commitments (see the section of Chapter 7 dealing with the
Federa I. National Mortgage Association).
The Housing act of 1950 was the final major piece of federal legislation
to influence mortgage markets in the first half of the postwar decade.
On balance, the act tended to stimulate further mortgage market activity
by making VA and FHA mortgages more attractive to both lenders and
borrowers.'° VA guarantees were increased from 50 per cent and a
ceiling of $4,000 to 60 per cent and a ceiling of $7,500, with the maximum
maturity extended from twenty-five to thirty years.The Veterans
Administration, furthermore, was given new authority to make direct
mortgage loans on terms equal to those on its guaranteed loans in areas
where the latter were not available from private lenders.
The authority of the Federal Housing Administration was also expanded
by the Housing Act of 1950 to include two new mortgage insurance
programs with liberal terms, one for small houses in rural communities
and outlying areas and another for cooperative housing projects."
Mortgage Markets in a Changing Setting, 1951—1956
The economic, financial, and sociopolitical setting in which mortgage
market:s functioned changed abruptly following the outbreak of war in
Korea. While it underwent further change in later years of the post-
World War II decade, the pre-Korea scene was already history. Federal
programs and policies were no longer directed towards unqualified
stimulation of activity. The almost unlimited liquidity enjoyed by finan-
cial institutions through the earlier price support of government securities
—whi;h for the individual lending institution made them almost inter-
changeable with cash—was sharply reduced by changes in federal
monetary and fiscal policies. Demands for residential building and real
estate, though less urgent than in earlier postwar years, continued generally
strong through the second half of the decade and for a time were under
10Theonly nonhiberalizing provision included in this act, in addition to the rescinding
of FNMA's advance commitment authority, was the withdrawal of authority for the VA
to guarzrltee small second mortgage loans in conjunction with FHA-insured first mortgage
loans.
Lessthan one year before passage of the Housing Act of 1950, another special purpose
program was born when FHA was authorized to insure mortgages on very liberal terms
for rent;il housing built on or near military installations (under a new Title VIII added to
the Natr.onal Housing Act by P.L. 211, 81st Congress, approved August 8, 1949). In 1949,
also,authority of FHA to insure mortgages on new rental housing (under the liberal
section 608 program), due to expire on March 31, 1949, was extended on four different
occasions and finally allowed to expire on March 1, 1950. FHA was actually authorized
to continue issuihg commitments under that program on applications for insurance
submitted on or before March 1, 1950.
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direct restraint by federal actions. Demands for industrial facilities, for
consumer goods, and for municipal improvements were also large during
much of the period after 1950.
In that framework, total demands on private capital and credit markets
at times exceeded the available supply of funds, including commercial
bank credit. As a consequence, during periods when interest rates and
yields were rising because of competition for limited funds, the attractive-
ness to investors of federally underwritten mortgages having inflexible
interest rates waned in favor of conventional mortgages and other capital
market securities with completely flexible rates (see Chapter 4 for discus-
sion of mortgage yields and Chapter 5 for analysis of shifting mortgage
flows).
MORTGAGE MARKETS UNDER RESTRAINT, 195 1—1953
For approximately three years after the beginning of Korean hostilities,
mortgage markets were under some federal restraint, either directly by
restrictive policies or indirectly by credit and monetary actions.Later,
with the lifting of direct federal government restrictions, mortgage
markets operated in an atmosphere alternating between credit ease and
restraint, influenced by general credit and monetary policies, private
capital market conditions, and the re-establishment of most of the pre-
Korean federal mortgage terms and practices. In that new environment,
further structural changes in mortgage markets occurred as lender reac-
tions varied; borrowers adjusted to or withdrew from the market, and
mortgage underwriting terms were alternately tightened and relaxed.
Earlj Post-Korean Restrictions
The Korean war started at a time when rising economic and financial
activity in the United States had already reached unusually high levels.
Demands for real estate and construction had expanded to the point
where they were straining the nation's productive capacity and resulting
in rapid increases in prices, wages, and costs. By mid-1950, even though
production of building materials and construction employment were at
record levels, shortages of materials and labor and consequent disorganiza-
tion of markets were common. In this setting, broad restrictive actions
were taken by the federal government to dampen inflationary pressures
and to conserve resources necessary to the successful prosecution of the
war. In construction and real estate markets, terms on which mortgage
credit could be made available were restricted and nonessential construc-
tion and the use of materials were limited.
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Within one month after the start of Korean hostilities, in response to
direct requests of the President, the Federal Housing and Veterans
took restricted terms on which they would insure and
guarantee mortgage credit, and the Federal Home Loan Bank system
adopted restrictive measures for member savings and loan associations.
Though fairly mild, they were the first restrictive actions taken by those
agencies in nearly twenty years of federal intervention in real estate and
mortgage markets. The most important were increase by 5 percentage
points of downpayments required on FHA and VA loans, setting construc-
tion costs prevailing on July 11, 1950 as the maximum for appraisal
purposes, and reduction from $16,000 to $14,000 of the maximum FHA
insurable loan on one-family houses.'2
Measures directly limiting nonessential construction, use of materials,
and limiting price increases followed in a short time. Administered by
newly created or reconstituted defense agencies—National Production
Authority, Office of Price Stabilization, and Wage Stabilization Board—
the measures were carried out through direct prohibition of certain types
of construction, requirement of authorization for other types, priorities
on basic and scarce materials for nondefense uses, and regulation of prices
and wages in the construction industry. The techniques of operation,
freque:atly changed, became stabilized by mid-1951 under the Controlled
Mater;ials Plan which allocated to users the three basic metals—steel,
copper, and aluminum. Supplementary "M" or limitation orders were
also directed towards the reduction of nonessential production.'3
Selecti;e Regulation of Real Estate Credit
Federal actiors restricting nonessential construction use of materials
were authorized by the Defense Production Act of 1950. For mortgage
markets, an added—perhaps heightened—significance of the Act lay in
presidential authority to regulate nonguaranteed or noninsured real
estate credit.Under Executive Order No. 10161, that authority was
12Otheractions included requirements for higher downpayments in FHA Title I
moderrization and repair loans, for narrowing of allowable uses of VA direct loan funds,
and for application of VA gratuity payments to the reduction of mortgage loan principal.
Formerly the gratuity payment to veterans of 4 per cent of the guaranteed portion of a
loan up to $160 could be used for any payments due on a purchased house.Its original
purpose was to provide one year's interest on the guaranteed portion of a veteran's
mortgage loan. The gratuity was discontinued as of September 1, 1953, by P.L. 149,
enacted July 27, 1953.
For a review of post-Korean restrictions on real estate credit and construction see two
articles in the Federal Reserve Bulletin:"Construction Activity and Mortgage .Credit,"
August 1950, pp. 936—937; and "Residential Real Estate Under Controls," August 1951,
pp. 908—912.
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delegated to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, with
the stipulation that the Board "obtain the concurrence of the Housing
and Home Finance Administrator with respect to provisions relating to
real estate construction credit involving residential property before
prescribing, changing or suspending any real estate construction credit
regulation pursuant to the authority of the Defense Production Act of
1950."
Accordingly, Regulation X, the first selective control ever applied to
real estate credit, was issued by the Board of Governors (effective October
12,1950) with the concurrence of the Housing and Home Finance
Administrator.Simultaneously, restrictions conforming to Regulation
Xwereplaced on FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed mortgage credit on
new one- and two-family dwellings. OnJanuary 12, 1951, Regulation X
was broadened to include new multifamily units and nonresidential
commercial structures (office buildings, warehouses, stores, banks, hotels,
motels, garages, restaurants).'4 The regulation did not restrict credit
granted on existing properties, except FHA and VA loans, where it
applied to both existing and new properties.
Regulation X and accompanying FHA and VA regulations were
designed to reduce the demand for real estate credit, and thereby the
volume of new construction and real estate transactions, by restricting
the terms on which mortgage loans could be made (see Table 11).
Minimum downpayments and rates of amortization together with maxi-
mum maturities were prescribed. The underlying formula allowed for a
schedule of downpayments according to prices of houses. Longer maximum
maturities, though not on a graduated basis, were permitted on loans
secured by lower-priced houses, but no maximum maturities were specified
on multifamily properties.All loans on nonresidential construction
subject to Regulation X conformed to existing lending practices and
administrative practicability—a maximum of 50 per cent of the value o f
the property and a maturity up to twenty-five years.'5
Successive modifications of terms prescribed by Regulation X followed,
either by administrative or legislative authority.16 In each case, changes
14RealEstate Credit, Regulation X, as amended effective February 15, 1951, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, p. 6.
15Boardof Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Regulation of Real Estate Credit
Under the Defense Production Act of 1950, prepared at the request of the Office of Defense
History, Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President (mimeographed),
February 24, 1953, p. 11.
16AmendmentsNo. 1, No. 6, and No. 11 to Regulation X described in Federal Reserve
Bulletin, March 1951, p. 271, September 1951, p. 1132, andJune 1952, pp. 650—65.1. See
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relaxed terms because of special needs associated with housing in defense
areas or because of recognized inequities in various price and income
groups. Finally, on September 16, 1952, just short of two years after they
were first imposed, came suspension of credit restrictions under Regulation
X and most of those under FHA and VA regulations in accordance with
provisions of the Defense Production Amendments of 1952.The act
of June 30, 1952 (the expiration date of Regulation X) extended for
one year the Regulation's authority and provided further for a "period of
residential credit control relaxation," during which downpayment require-
ments could not exceed 5 per cent of the transaction price. The period
was to begin after three consecutive months with housing starts below a
seasonally adjusted annual rate of 1.2 million.Production of housing
having remained below that number during June, July, and August, 1952,
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System suspended Regu-
lation X as of September 16, 1952.
Accompanying the suspension of Regulation X, restrictions on terms of
FHA and VA loans were removed except for the requirements of a
minimum downpayment of 5 per cent, a maximum maturity of twenty-five
years, and a maximum FHA loan amount of $14,000 on one-family
houses.'7 By April 1953, with the further abatement of inflationary pres-
sures, all remaining credit restrictions were revoked, and statutory terms
of mortgage lending were restored to the levels before October 12, 1950.
Program of Voluntary Credit Restraint
During most of the Regulation X period, a general voluntary credit
restraint program, encompassing extension of real estate credit, was also
in effect.General authority "to encourage financing institutions to
enter into voluntary agreements and programs to restrain credit" was
included in the Defense Production Act of 1950 and delegated by the
President to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
In announcing the new program, the Board requested all institutions
to extend credit in ways that would "help maintain and increase the
strength of the domestic economy through the restraint of inflationary
tendencies and at the same time to help finance the defense program
and theessential needs of agriculture,industry and commerce."8
17Therestrictions applied chiefly to VA loans, which before the credit regulations
could be made with no clownpayment and for as long as thirty years. Now for VA-
guaranteed loans on houses priced between $7,000 to $8,400, a 4 per cent downpayment
was required. On houses priced below $7,000, no downpayment on loans was required
but closing costs up to 4 per cent of the price had to be paid in cash.
18"Programfor Voluntary Credit Restraint," Federal Resevve BulleLin, March 1951,
p. 263.
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One standard proposed by the Board to cooperating institutions was to
screen loan applications not only for credit-worthiness but also by
criteria of purpose and uses of loans. As a general criterion for sound
lending, the Board's view was that each loan should "commensurately
increase or maintain production, processing and distribution of essential
goods and services."19
The program was implemented by the National Voluntary Credit
Restra:int Committee, including representatives of commercial banks, life
insurance companies, mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations,
and investment banking firms. The national committee coordinated the
work of a system of committees, among them, regional committees com-
posed of representatives of participating financing institutions in diver-
gent geographic areas. For the guidance of the regional committees in
dealing with inquiries of financial institutions about particular applica-
tions for credit, the national committee issued a statement of principles
and various bulletins on recommendations developed for specific types
of credit.2°
For real estate credit, recommendations were limited to transactions
outside the scope of Regulation X—chiefly loans on existing properties
and sale-leaseback arrangements on commercial and industrial properties.
Recommendations followed a general principle of the national committee,
that the function of the program was not "to make the transfer of real
estate impossible or impracticable, but rather to reduce inflationary
pressures by limiting the amount of additional credit created in the
process of real estate transfer."2'Financial institutions were urged to
limit real estate loans to keep total mortgage debt outstanding on any
property within the larger of two amounts, two-thirds of its value or the
limits imposed by Regulation X on such new construction.22 Application
of the principles of the program was strongly recommended also to certain
kinds of property leasing. The committee urged recognition of the fact
that leasing arrangements, when used in connection with existing con-
struction of all types and with new construction of commercial or industrial
buildings, were sometimes used as substitutes for mortgage financing.
Some examples of such leasing arrangements cited by the committee were
p. 264.
20 Policy and the Management of the Public Debt, Their Role in Achieving Price
Stability and High-Level Employrnent,replies to questions other material for the use of the
subcozr.mittee on general credit control and debt management, Joint Committee on the
Economic Report, 82nd Congress, Partp. 433.
21BulletinNo. 4 of the Voluntary Credit Restraint Committee, "Loans on Real Estate,"
Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1951, pp. 752—753.
22MonetaryPolicy and the Management of the Public Debt, p. 436.
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"sale-leaseback arrangements, long-term leases which may be renewed for
a nominal rental, and leases in which the lessee has the right to have rental
payments applied to the purchase price in a subsequent exercise of an
option to buy the leased property."23
The voluntary credit restraint program was suspended May 12, 1952
(four months before the suspension of Regulation X) by the Board of
Governors in accordance with a recommendation of the national com-
mittee.24 Legal authority for the program was repealed June 30 with the
enactment of the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, which
provided "that no voluntary program or agreement for the control of
credit shall be approved or carried out.
Some indication of the impact of selective real estate credit regulations
on the flow of funds into various mortgage sectors is given in Chapter 5,
pp. 126—128. The delayed decline in mortgage flows into newconstruction
indicate the time lags in effectuating the post-Korean restrictions. They
resulted partly from the unusually large volume of mortgage commitments
outstanding and were in part the usual lags associated with real estate
activity (see Chapter 7, pp. 175—176). The subsequent decline in mortgage
lending, moreover, must be attributed largely to the concurrent operation
of a restrictive monetary policy, and only in part to selective credit regu-
lations. Though the direct impact of real estate credit controls is not
measurable, there can probably be little doubt that, among those in opera-
tion, the voluntary credit restraint program was the least effective. The
real estate credit area covered by the program—conventional mortgage
loans on existing houses—expanded steadily during the period of voluntary
credit restraint, while other types of real estate credit declined. In part
this may have reflected the voluntary nature of the program and in part
the fact that, with all other areas of residential real estate credit under
legal restraint, the one nonlegally regulated area was stimulated.
While the voluntary credit restraint program appears to have been
ineffective in real estate markets, there is no way to determine whether the
extension of conventional mortgage credit on existing houses would have
been even greater in its absence. The question remains also whether
general monetary restraints would have been so effective in the absence
of the selective regulation of real estate credit through Regulation X
andassociated FHA and VA regulations.
Bulletin No. 4, Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 1952, p. 24.
24"Suspensionof Program for Voluntary Credit Restraint," Federal Reserve Bullelin,
May 1952, p. 501.
25FederalReserve Bulletin, July 1952, p. 772.
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Moneta'ry and Debt Management Policies and Liquidity of Financial
Institutions
A turning point in postwar capital market developments was the change
in federal monetary and debt-management policies, set forth in the joint
announcement (March 4, 1951) by the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Both
authorities had "reached full accord with respect to debt-management and
monetary policies to be pursued in furthering their common purpose to
assure the successful financing of the Government's requirements and, at
the same time, to minimize monetization of the public debt."2° The agree-
ment resulted in the withdrawal of inflexible Federal Reserve support of
the government securities market, and thus for the first time in the postwar
period permitted market forces to determine prices and yields of those
securities.
Concurrently, the Treasury announced a new offering of long-term
nonmarketable bonds bearing aper cent coupon in exchange for
outstandingper cent Treasury bonds of 1967—1972. One intention
of the action was to discourage long-term investors from liquidating
their holdings of government securities.In that new market framework,
mortgage lenders could no longer look to their government securities
portfolio as a ready source of funds for acquisition of mortgages. Indeed,
for some months after the announcements of the accord and new Treasury
offering, lenders were unwilling to sell their government securities at the
reduced prices then prevailing. Hence funds available for new mortgage
shrank as the large volume of mortgage commitments made
earlier absorbed such funds available from other sources.
As demands for credit and capital continued to press upon the supply
of savings during the two years following the accord, monetary and debt-
management policies were directed towards the restraint of bank credit
expansion and minimizing of debt monetization. By early 1953, the
Federal Reserve had raised the discount rate to 2 per cent from the
early 1951 low of 1per cent, and the Treasury had issued a new long-term
bond bearing aper cent rate. In the face of generally rising interest
rates and yields, federally underwritten mortgages with less flexible rates
became unattractive to investors with alternative uses of funds. In May
1953, maximum interest rates on FHA and VA loans were increased to
per cent, a level more in line with returns on competitive investments.
Some indication of the reduced liquidity of financial institutions in
26FederalReserve Bulletin, March 1951, p.267.
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the years following the "accord" is given in Table 10. Though the main
types of financial institutions still owned a large volume of U.S. govern-
ment bonds at the time of the accord—some $87 billion—they disposed
of less than $13 billion between 1951 and 1956.This was only about
one-third of the net amount sold in the first half of the postwar decade.
It was, moreover, only about one-fifth of the net acquisition of mortgages
in the second half, 195 1—1956. In that period, therefore, in contrast to the
preceding five years, it was the net inflow of savings for all types of financial
intermediaries that provided the major source of funds for mortgage invest-
ment. Among the major types of financial institutions, there were marked
differences in liquidity and investment behavior, just as there were in the
first half of the postwar decade. The analysis of these differences will be
taken up in Chapter 5.
Reduction in FNMA Support of the Mortgage Market
Reinforcing the limitations of mortgage market activity through direct
and indirect credit restraints, so far noted, were a series of administrative
and statutory actions reducing the broad support of the Federal National
Mortgage Association. The advance commitment authority of the Associa-
tion had already been repealed in April 1950, and contracts to purchase
new mortgages were being made on an "over-the-counter" basis only.
Further actions circumscribing FNMA support during the next three years
included: (I) the requirement that mortgages, to be eligible for purchase,
must be insured or guaranteed by FHA and VA and held by the originator,
all within specified time limits; (2) reduction in the proportion of its loans
that could be sold to FNMA by a lender; (3) allocation of funds for pur-
chase of mortgages under emergency housing programs, reducing the
amount available for general market support; and (4) suspension of
purchases of mortgages not covered by those special programs.27
The first action, involving time limitations, was taken June 29, 1951,
when FNMA announced that it would confine its purchases to mortgages
insured or guaranteed on or after March 1,1951, and held by the
originator for not less than two months or more than one year. The
motive underlying it was to prevent possible large-scale disposal of
mortgages by lenders in order to fulfill earlier mortgage commitments
or to purchase securities, following the Federal Reserve-Treasury accord
and subsequent capital market changes. The second, allocation of funds
for special housing, occurred during the next six months. FNMA set
"FNMA in the Postwar Mortgage Market," Monthly Review of Credit and Business
Conditions, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, December 1955, p. 160.
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aside a total of $600 million of its uncommitted funds for the purchase of
mortgages on emergency types of housing programmed by the Housing
and Home Finance Administrator in critical defense areas, for military
use under Title VIII of the National Housing Act, and for victims
of major disasters.28 In addition, the Association was authorized to issue
advance commitments to purchase such mortgages in an amount not to
exceed $200 million outstanding by the end ofl95l.29 Bytheend of March
1952, less than $50 million was available for the purchase of mortgages not
on defense, military, or disaster housing.
In early April, with the complete exhaustion of uncommitted funds,
FNMA took its third action, suspending purchase of mortgages not
covered by special federal programs.3° Purchases were resumed in early
September of that year, following passage of the Housing Act of 1952. Its
authorization of $900 million for advance FNMA commitments to pur-
chase mortgages on defense, military, and disaster housing freed the re-
maining $362 million reserved for such purchases to be spent for other
types of mortgages. Resumption of purchases outside the special federal
programs by FNMA, however, restricted lenders to sale of not more than
half their eligible FHA and VA mortgage loans made after March 1,
1952)11Previously lenders could sell to FNMA all of the VA loans they
had originated during a specified period.
The additional relatively small amount of funds made available to
FNMA for purchase of mortgages on nondefense and nondisaster housing
was soon exhausted, and in early April 1953, the Association again sus-
pended those purchases until the reorganization of FNMA under a new
charter on November 1, 1954. Nondefense and nondisaster mortgages,
however, again became eligible for purchase in July 1953, under a new
"one-for-one" program authorized by the Housing Amendments of 1953.32
The inauguration of that program brought to an end a period of about two
years during FNMA had provided little or no support to the mort-
gage market.
28Fundswere set aside by administrative action for housing on three separate occasions:
July 16, 1951, $350 million (FNMA Bulletin No. 185); August 31, 1951, $50 million
(FNMA Bulletin No. 192); and October 2, 1951, $200 million (FNMA Bulletin No. 198).
29P.L.139, 82nd Congress, approved September 1, 1951.
3°Backgroundand History of the Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal National
Mortgage Association, April 30, 1955 (multilithed) p. 31.
31P.L.531, 82nd Congress, approved July 14, 1952. This act also raised the advance
commitment authority of FNMA to purchase defense, military, and disaster mortgages to
$1,152 million. Previously the commitment authority had been increased to $252 million
by PubLic Law 309, 82nd Congress, approved April 9, 1952.
32P.L.94, 83rd Congress, approved June 31, 1953. The "one-for-one" program is
discussed in the next section.
65ELEMENTS IN THE CHANGING MORTGAGE MARKET
RESUMPTION OF EXPANSIONARY FORCES, 1953—1956
Withthe abatement of inflationary pressures, the Federal Reserve moved
vigorously in the spring of 1953 to reverse its earlier policy of credit res-
traint. The first open-market purchases of Treasury securities in May were
followed by purchases in June, August, and September to supply additional
reserves to the banking system. In July, moreover, the Federal Reserve
reduced bank reserve requirements on net demand deposits. In December,
the Federal Open Market Committee declared its policy to be the promotion
of economic growth and stability "by actively maintaining a condition of
ease in the money market."33 This policy was continued through most of
1954, implemented by reductions in the Reserve Bank discount rate in
February and April, additional open market purchases in late spring, and
a further lowering of member bank reserve requirements around mid-year.
Accompanying the Federal Reserve policy of "active ease," a supply of
funds in excess of demand generally characterized financial markets during
1954. With the mild recession also, the net flow of savings into financial
intermediaries increased at anaccelerated rate and debt repayments were
large. The volume of new corporate securities available to investors, on
the other hand, was well below the 1952—i 953 peak as plant and equipment
expenditures declined. Moreover, net borrowings of the federal govern-
ment were sharply reduced in 1954 and no long-term bonds were offered.
Short-term credit demands by businesses and consumers were also
markedly reduced in that year.
The interaction of reduced credit demands and increased availability of
funds resulted in a marked general decline in interest rates and yields in
financial markets.The competitive position of mortgages, therefore,
especially federally underwritten mortgages, was considerably improved.
Mortgages regained favor as investment media for financial inter-
mediaries, and they made funds available through 1954 and into 1955
on far more favorable terms than in preceding years.
Coincident with the developing ease in financial markets from mid-1953
through 1954, federal actions were directed specifically towards broadening
and stimulating housing and mortgage markets. In April 1953, remaining
restrictions on FHA and VA loans, imposed in October 1950, were
removed by administrative action, and on June 30 statutory authority to
restrain such credit under the Defense Act of 1950 expired.
Maturities up to previous statutory maxima were again permitted, for FHA
loans twenty-five years (thirty years in some cases for loans on small
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Fortieth Annual Report, 1953,
Appendix, "Record of Policy Actions, p. 101.
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and for VA loans, thirty years. Further, minimum downpayments
on houses purchased with VA loans were no longer required. With the
earlier suspension of Regulation X and the Voluntary Credit Restraint
Program, mortgage markets thus were completely free of restrictions
for the first time in nearly three years.
Moreover, to improve the competitive position of federally underwritten
mortgages in the capital market, maximum interest rates of 4 per cent
previously permitted on VA-guaranteed and ftpercent on most
home mortgage loans were increased in early May 1953,
top.er cent. This action followed several months of reduced availability
of fund.s for FHA and VA loans in the face of rising yields on alternative
investments.34Under the housing amendments of 1953, maximum
interesi; rates on other FHA home loans were increased (June 30).
More important for its basic effect on mortgage markets was an amend-
ment of earlier legislation, permitting builders and sellers to absorb
discounts associated with the sale of VA-guaranteed mortgages. Thus VA
loans could compete more effectively in the capital market with other
loans and securities whose rates were flexible.35 Other provisions of the
Housing Amendments of 1953 made it possible for FNMA to participate
more actively in mortgage markets by authorizing the Association to use,
for the general purchase of mortgages, part of the $900 million reserved a
year earlier for purchases of defense, military, and disaster mortgages only,
and by establishing the "one-for-one" program. Under that program,
FNMA. was permitted to enter firm agreements with purchasers of its
mortgages to buy an equal amount of eligible mortgages from such pur-
chasers within one year. Armed with firm FNMA commitments to pur-
chase permanent residential mortgages, builders and mortgage originators
were able to obtain interim short-term financing for construction projects
that probably would not be otherwise obtainable.36
84TheFHA increase was authorized, effective May 2, by the Commissioner of the
Federal Housing Administration, as permitted under the National Housing Act. The VA
increase was authorized, effective May 5, by the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, as provided for in the Housing Act of 1948.
See Chapter 4 for a more complete discussion of mortgage interest rates and yields
and the and operation of mortgage discounts.
Th Federal National Mortgage Association placed the "one-for-one" program in
operation on July 27, 1953, with a total purchasing authority of $500 million.It estab-
lished sa,es prices of 96 per cent of par on VA 4 per cent loans, 97.75 on FHA ft per cent
loans, and par for the then recently authorized ft per cent FHA and VA loans. Purchases
of mortgages under t:hat program—limited to FHA and VA loans bearing ft per cent
interest lates—were at par, less total charges of 1 per
centfor the FNMA advance contract to purchase plusper cent for acquisition and
service cDsts on mortgages actually purchased.(See "Residential Real Estate Develop-
ments," FederalReserveBulletin, August 1953, p. 814.)
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The use made of the one-for-one program by the mortgage and building
industries appears in figures showing that sales from FNMA's mortgage
portfolio increased sharply in late 1953 and advanced to a postwar peak in
spring of 1954. The $500 million authorization was exhausted before the
scheduled expiration of the program on July 1, 1954. At the same time,
with the easing of mortgage markets, FNMA was not called upon to
honor all of its commitments to purchase mortgages, and some $70 million
of such commitments expired unused.37
The Housing Act of 1954 authorized additional federal actions to
stimulate further the demand for and supply of residential mortgage
credit.38The actions authorized included liberalization of the FHA
mortgage insurance program and of the terms of loans by federal savings
and loan associations as well as establishment of the Voluntary Home
Mortgage Credit Program. Brief descriptions of these and other related
provisions of the act will suffice here.
Liberalization of terms under which the Federal Housing Administra-
tion could insure mortgages on both new and existing properties included:
raising the maximum amount of loans on one- and two-family dwellings
from $16,000 to $20,000; increasing the maximum loan-to-value ratios on
new properties from 90 to 95 per cent and on existing properties from 80 to
90 per cent; and lengthening maximum maturities from twenty-five to
thirty years. The difference between mortgage terms on new and existing
properties, formerly substantial, was nearly eliminated by the act. The
FHA program was further broadened and liberalized by a new provision of
far more liberal terms for insurance of mortgages on homes for servicemen
than for civilians.
Federal savings and loan associations were permitted to increase the
maximum amount of their home mortgage loans from $20,000 to $35,000.
Supplementing this provision of the act, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board authorized, December 1954, member savings and loan associations
to lengthen mortgage loan maturities from twenty to twenty-five years.
The Voluntary Home Mortgage Credit Program was designed to en-
courage private lenders to make funds available for federally underwritten
mortgages on housing located in small and remote communities where
local capital or loan facilities may be inadequate. The services are avail-
able to minority groups in any area on terms as favorable as for others. Its
national committee and sixteen regional committees composed of represen-
tatives of the mortgage industry receive applications from prospective
"FNMAin the Postwar Mortgage Market," p. 160.
38P.L.560, 83rd Congress, enacted August 2, 1954.
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mortgage borrowers, just described, and attempt to place mortgage loans
with voluntary participating lenders. The primary objective of the pro-
gram is to minimize or obviate the need for direct federal mortgage lending.
The same objective—ultimate substitution of privateforfederal
ownership of mortgages—underlies another major but not liberalizing
provision of the act, which authorized the reorganization of FNMA.
Under its new charter, FNMA was directed to reorganize its structure
into separate and distinct operations providing for:(1) a secondary
market for federally underwritten residential mortgages; (2) special assist-
ance for financing selected types of mortgages originated under special
housing programs; and (3) management and liquidation of its mortgage
portfolio held or acquired pursuant to contracts entered into under its
previous charter.39
While the Housing Act of 1954 had a significant influence on residential
mortgage markets in later years,it played no part whatever in the
expansion that occurred during the second half of 1954. At the time,
the view was widely held that the expansion was the direct result of the
liberalizing provisions of the act.It is clear, however, that the 1954 rise in
mortgage and housing activity was limited almost entirely to the VA
sector of the market; the 1954 Housing Act provided no change in VA
mortgage terms. The act liberalized terms only of FHA loans, and the
volume of such loans showed little change during 1954.40 The increase
in FHA mortgage flows a year later, mainly for financing existing houses,
is traceable in large part to the liberalizing provisions of the Housing
Act of 1954 (see Chapter 5, p. 129).
MORTGAGE MARKETS ONCE AGAIN UNDER RESTRAINT, 1955—1956
The pace of business activity began to quicken inlate1954 and
continued strongly upward during 1955. Demands for credit by business,
consumers, and governments to finance expenditures for plant and equip-
ment, durable goods, and public projects increased to record levels. The
demands strained capital and money markets and also the productive re-
sources of the nation. A rapid upturn in interest rates, costs, and prices
followed during 1955.In the construction industry cost and price
advances came after nearly three years of remarkable stability.In that
rapidly developing inflationary setting, federal actions were turned once
Chapter 7, section on Federal National Mortgage Association, for a fuller
discussion of the reorganization of FNMA. See also "FNMA in the Postwar Mortgage
Market," pp. 161—162.
40SeeSaulB. Klaman,"Effects of Credit and Monetary Policy on Real Estate Markets,
1952—1954,"Journalof Land Economics, August 1956,pp.246—247.
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again toward restraining demands for mortgage credit and supply of it and
toward limiting credit expansion generally.
Thus, during the closing years of the first postwar decade, activity in
mortgage markets was again under restraint as in 195 1—1953. There were
important differences between the two periods, however, in the nature of
the restraints operating. Throughout most of the earlier period, both
general credit and monetary policies and specific federal mortgage pro-
grams and policies were directed towards restraint; during most of 1955
those policies were coordinated, but during 1956 they operated in opposite
directions. As mortgage credit became increasingly stringent during 1955,
the federal government reversed its policy of restraint in administering
mortgage programs. During 1956, all major administrative and statutory
actions were directed chiefly towards easing the tightness that had devel-
oped in mortgage markets. As the year and the decade ended, however,
the effectiveness of the policies proved to be limited in the face of continuing
strong demands for both short- and long-term loans, the effects of restric-
tive Federal Reserve credit and monetary policy, and the resulting rising
interest rates and yields on corporate, state and local, and federal govern-
ment securities.
Coordinated Actions Restraining Mortgage Activity
As the general business recovery accelerated, the Federal Reserve
gradually modified its policy of "active ease" in effect through most of 1954.
In its directive of December 7, 1954, the Federal Open Market Committee
declared its policy to be promotion of economic growth and stability
"by maintaining a condition of ease in the money market."4' The word
"actively," included in the policy directive of December 15, 1953 (see page
66) was deleted, and the new policy was designed to restrain inflationary
tendencies.Between April and November 1955, four increases in the
Reserve Bank rediscount rate raised it fromper cent toper cent.
Open market operations limiting bank credit expansion were initiated
around early August. An increasingly restrictive monetary policy in 1956
brought the rediscount rate to 3 per cent by late summer, the highest in
nearly twenty-five years.
Supplementing the monetary actions of the Federal Reserve, the
federal mortgage insurance and guaranteeing agencies acted to restrain
demands for mortgage credit.Effective April 28,1955, the Federal
Housing Administration and Veterans Administration required that all
41Boardof Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Forty-first Annual Report, 1954,
Appendix, p. 98.
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closing costs for houses purchased with FHA and VA loans be paid in
cash.42 This meant that for VA mortgages the "no downpayment loan,"
(in total amount, with closing costs, exceeding the appraised value of
the property) was eliminated.Shortly thereafter, both federal agencies
increased minimum downpayments by 2 percentage points and reduced
maximum loan maturities from thirty to twenty-five years.43
In mid-July, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board joined other federal
agencics attempting to limit mortgage credit expansion by urging savings
and loan associations to curb their forward commitments to make loans.
This advice was followed, September 13, by requests to each Federal
Home Loan Bank "to advise its member institutions to follow a loan
program which will meet loan demands out of savings and loan repay-
"44Savingsand loan associations had been relying more than
usually on borrowings to finance their expanded mortgage lending pro-
grams. By the end of summer advances from Federal Home Loan Banks
amounted to a record $1.2 billion compared with less than $700 million a
year earlier. The Federal Home Loan Banks had, in the meantime, in-
creased interest rates to member associations in line with rates on funds
borrowed in the capital market.
Reversal of Federal Ivlortgage Policies
Before 1955 had ended, federal mortgage policies were reversed and
through 1956 were directed towards stimulation of market activity. On
December 13, 1955, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board eased somewhat
the restrictions imposed in September.It permitted member institutions
to borrow funds for mortgage lending in amounts not to exceed 10 per cent
of savings capital.45 InJanuary 1956, the Federal Housing Administration
and Veterans Administration rescinded their previous reduction of loan
maturities and restored the maximum maturities to thirty years.46 The
Federal National Mortgage Association announced an optional mortgage
repurchase plan allowing, for a 1 per cent fee, repurchase within nine
months of mortgages sold to FNMA at the selling price.47Institutions
Veterans Administration, Information Service, press release, April 27, 1955; Federal
Housing Administration, 1955 Annual Report of Housing and Home Finance Agency,
p. 45.
Veterans Administration Information Service, press release, July 30, 1955; Federal
Housing Administration, press release No. 55—57, July 31, 1955.
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board, press release, September 13, 1955.
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board, press release, December 13, 1955.
"Vterans Adjjiinistration Emergency Interim Issue (EM 4AB-128) and Federal
Housing Administration letter to all approved mortgagees, January 17, 1956.
"FNMA press release No. 202, January 25, 1956.
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could thus obtain temporary funds for new lending without permanently
disposing of favorable mortgage holdings.
Administrative actions were supplemented by the Housing Act of 1956,
which in the main liberalized the terms of FHA mortgage insurance
and FNMA secondary market programs.48Loan-to-value ratios on
which FHA would insure mortgages on existing one- to four-family
houses were made equal to those on new houses. On multifamily rental
housing both loan-to-value ratios and maximum loan amounts were
increased. The Act authorized FNMA to reduce from 3 to 2 per cent
the amount of stock to be bought by sellers of mortgages to FNMA,
and to1per cent under certain conditions.It authorized FNMA to
issue "standby" commitments for one year to purchase mortgages—a
practice introduced earlier by financial institutions.49 Further statutory
action at about the same time extended the VA loan guarantee program
for World War II veterans until July 1958, with provision for loan
applications on hand to be covered up to July 1959. For Korean War
veterans the VA loan guarantee program was extended to January 1965.
The federal government continued to attack the tight mortgage credit
situation on both the demand and supply fronts in a coordinated action
announced by the White House, September 1956. The FHA reduced
downpayment requirements on houses appraised at $9,000 or less for
mortgage insurance purposes.The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
increased the amount of advances member institutions could have
outstanding from Federal Home Loan Banks from 10 to 12.5 per cent
of their savings capital. The Federal National Mortgage Association,
in addition to reducing the amounts of stock to be purchased by those
selling mortgages to the Association from 2 to 1 per cent of the value of
mortgages sold, raised the purchase price of its standby commitments
from 92 to 94 per cent of par. The new price was not far below the
bottom of the range of FNMA purchase prices for immediate delivery.
In addition, in order to maximize its support of the market for new
houses, FNMA announced (November 1956) limitation of its purchases
under the secondary mortgage market program to mortgages insured or
guaranteed no earlier than four months before the proposed sale to the
Association.5°
48P.L.1020, 84th Congress, August 7, 1956.
See Chapter 7, section on Mortgage Commitment Techniques, for a discussion of the
standby commitments. Essentially, they are given by a financial institution in considera-
tion of the nonrefundable fee associated with such commitments. The commitment price
is so far below the prevailing market price that the institution does not expect to be called
upon to fulfill it.
FNMApress release No. 227, November 23, 1956.
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Notwithstanding the many Federal actions, funds for federally under-
written mortgages continued to be difficult to obtain because of their
competitive interest rate disadvantage. Reflecting demand pressures in all
sectors of the capital market, yields on long-term corporate, municipal,
and government securities had advanced rapidly to new postwar highs
during 1956 (Chapter 4,Chart7). To make insured mortgage loans more
attractive to investors in this situation, the Federal Housing Administra-
tion increased their permitted maximum interest rate fromto 5 per cent,
effective December 4, 1956.51 The increase was the first since May, 1953,
when interest rates on both FHA and VA loans were increased. The
Veterans Administration had no administrative authority to increase fur-
ther the interest rate on VA loans, however, which remained atper cent
as 1956 ended. The general subject of mortgage interest rates is dealt with
in Chapter 4.
51FederalHousing Administration, press release No. 56—59, December 1, 1956. The
permitted maximum interest rate for mortgages insured on multifamily housing (FHA
Section 207 loans) and on cooperative housing (FHA Section 213 loans) was increased
fromto ft per cent.
73